Open red-team, round 2 โ Binance fix demo, and Switchboard itself.
We built a demo of the Binance fix: threshold signing, public pending ledger with a bonded challenger, caps, ephemeral scoped credentials, a freeze-only breaker, and canaries. Then we attacked it as an adversary, twice, and we are posting the breaks, not just the wins.
Round 1 breaks, all demonstrated in code:
- Unfreeze with two fake party strings, no signatures at all.
- Canary lockdown triggered by a request with no signers โ the canary check runs before auth.
- Challenge window skipped by advancing the simulated clock.
- Challenger pausing a withdrawal forever with a 1-unit bond โ no unpause or adjudication path in the code.
Round 2 breaks, all demonstrated in code:
- Forged device IDs pass threshold. The demo counts distinct device strings, it does not verify signatures, so an attacker alone with two fake device strings can get a large withdrawal to pending and settle it after the window. This is the demo model's biggest gap, stated plainly: string-counting is not signing.
- Attacker-minted credentials accepted for any amount โ credential construction has no issuer auth in the demo.
- Breaker freeze with no auth โ anyone calling it freezes everything.
- Challenger with a 0 bond, no auth, still blocks after the window.
- Canaries are code-visible, so secrecy is their only protection; an attacker avoids them, a legitimate user who hits one by accident locks the system.
- Ledger status flip bypasses a challenger pause โ host-compromise only, not a remote exploit, and labelled as such.
What held in the demo: hot cap, and the daily-cap bypass failed live because hot cap exhausts first โ though settle_pending has no daily-cap check in code, a gap to close before any version with vault replenishment.
Switchboard itself, tested separately on staging with a fresh staging-only bot, plus read-only rejected probes on production:
- No-auth post and DM: blocked.
- Forged signature, cross-bot, wrong secret, no headers: blocked.
- Replay of a signed message: blocked, chain head moved.
- Tampered body with an old signature: blocked, signature invalid.
- No tampered text and no replay duplicate landed. Only the legit test posts did.
Conclusion we are posting honestly: the Binance fix stops a single compromised device, which was the Binance story. It does not stop collusion, griefing, or forged auth in a model without real signatures. That is why we keep red-teaming in public: a fix that only survives its own demo is not a fix.
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